Patient Experience Journal
Volume 8

Issue 3

Article 10

2021

The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family
advisory committees (PFACs): A comparative health system
analysis between England and Ontario
Umair Majid
University of Toronto

Follow this and additional works at: https://pxjournal.org/journal
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Commons

Recommended Citation
Majid U. The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory committees (PFACs):
A comparative health system analysis between England and Ontario. Patient Experience Journal. 2021;
8(3):88-99. doi: 10.35680/2372-0247.1562.

This Research is brought to you for free and open access by Patient Experience Journal. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Patient Experience Journal by an authorized editor of Patient Experience Journal.

The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory
committees (PFACs): A comparative health system analysis between England
and Ontario
Cover Page Footnote
This article is associated with the Patient, Family & Community Engagement lens of The Beryl Institute
Experience Framework (https://www.theberylinstitute.org/ExperienceFramework). You can access other
resources related to this lens including additional PXJ articles here: http://bit.ly/PX_PtFamComm

This research is available in Patient Experience Journal: https://pxjournal.org/journal/vol8/iss3/10

Patient Experience Journal
Volume 8, Issue 3 – 2021, pp. 88-99

Research

The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory
committees (PFACs): A comparative health system analysis between
England and Ontario
Umair Majid, University of Toronto, umair.majid@mail.utoronto.ca
Abstract
There has been a proliferation of patient engagement (PE) in healthcare activities. However, the concept of
“engagement” has existed for decades; the first Patient and Family Advisory Committees (PFACs) in North America
were formed in the 1970s. These committees are an important mechanism for involving patients and family and have
proliferated across the healthcare sector. However, it is unclear how or why PFACs became the predominant mechanism
for PE. The objective of this comparative analysis is to review the historical context and legislative imperatives that have
contributed to the proliferation of PFACs in Ontario, Canada and England, United Kingdom.
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Introduction
Description of Policy

In the last decade, health systems around the world have
experienced the proliferation of patient engagement (PE)
in multiple forms and healthcare activities.1 Systems are
increasingly integrating the principles of user involvement
and consumer engagement into the design, delivery, and
improvement of health services. Today, PE is widespread
in activities such as health technology assessment, clinical
guideline development, research, and quality
improvement.2-5
Despite its recent proliferation, PE has existed in certain
areas of health for decades. The first Patient and Family
Advisory Committees (PFACs) in North America were
formed in pediatric hospitals and mental health service
facilities in the 1970s.6 These PFACs involved children,
youth, and parents in clinical care decisions, the design of
health services, and quality improvement initiatives. Since
the establishment of these pioneering PFACs, this
mechanism has become widespread at multiple levels of
the health system, especially in general hospitals and health
service facilities. For example, a recent survey found that
of 110 hospitals in the State of New York, 59% reported
having a PFAC and 12% were developing one.7 Members
of these PFACs influence operations, leadership decisions,
and strategies, provide training and orientation on PE to
non-members, integrate the objectives and principles of
PE in other hospital committees, and conduct ongoing
evaluations of their work.7 Similarly, in a survey of 102
hospitals in the province of Ontario, Canada, 66.7% and
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57.8% reported at least one PFAC for clinical and
corporate activities, respectively.8
PFACs are a PE mechanism that allow for greater and
more meaningful participation of patients, family, and care
representatives in healthcare activities within institutions
and organizations. In some jurisdictions, such as Ontario,
PFACs are supported by legislative imperatives that
narrow the gap between healthcare planning and service
users. PFACs do not operate only within the hospital
sector; they also exist in regional health authorities,
communities, agencies, and subnational and national
governments. There are three types of PFACs: general
(focused on organizational issues), population-focused
(serve specific communities), and condition-focused (serve
specific medical conditions).9

Goals of Policy

PFACs serve a variety of purposes with regards to
healthcare planning. In some jurisdictions, PFACs seek to
accommodate a growing desire to bring healthcare
decision-making closer to service users and improve health
system sustainability by increasing the responsiveness of
health services.9 These goals seem to have been prompted
by growing citizen interest in greater transparency and
accountability in healthcare; a desire that reflects the
advent of consumer-driven industries during the late 20th
and early 21st centuries.10 These goals were also bolstered
by regionalization of healthcare. In Ontario, for example,
the Canada Health Act (1984) set the precedent for
provinces to plan and operate their own healthcare plan to
better reflect the unique needs and priorities of its
population.11 This Act enabled Ontario and other
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provinces to decentralize healthcare decision-making by
creating regional health authorities. The structure of these
authorities rendered opportunities for greater and more
meaningful participation of service users in healthcare
activities.
The Triple Aim of healthcare advocated for improving
patient health outcomes while maintaining healthcare
spending and enhancing the patient experience.12 A desire
by healthcare professionals and decision-makers to
improve patient experience also contributed to the
creation of PFACs. Institutional pressures to improve
patients’ experiences, patient-centered care, and PE
strengthened the position of PFACs in healthcare. In these
circumstances, PFACs may have been perceived by
healthcare professionals and hospital decision-makers as a
mechanism to achieve patient experience objectives by
transforming the design and delivery of health services to
be more inclusive and meaningful to patients, family, and
care representatives. The spread of PFACs across the
hospital sector may also reflect shifting policy imperatives
that respond to calls by the public, including patients and
family, for health policy-makers and professionals to
exemplify higher accountability in healthcare decisionmaking.13-15 These pressures have been reinforced by a
strong need for transparency, dialogue, and partnership in
healthcare activities, which provide strong policy and
ethical imperatives for the meaningful involvement of
patients. PFACs may also serve as a policy lever to
advocate for greater collaboration with patients in
designing health services to be more relevant, appropriate,
and useful to them, which creates health services that are
of higher quality, more sustainable, acceptable to endusers, and cost-efficient for health systems.16-17
An assumption in these efforts has been that by engaging
patients, family, and care representatives in discussions on
emergent health care issues, the responsiveness of health
services will improve, and accordingly, health services will
become more sustainable. This understanding stems from
the belief that diverse stakeholder input improves the
sustainability and quality of services that also improves
their legitimacy, uptake, and sustainment.18 However, it
appears that governments and health service organizations
may have used PFACs tokenistically in some instances to
achieve symbolic goals of perceived transparency and
accountability without the necessary legwork to involve
patients and family in ways that truly transform the design
and delivery of health services. Moreover, some healthcare
professionals may employ PFACs to support existing ways
of practice and legitimize existing interventions and
innovations. As this paper will demonstrate, this
observation is perhaps reflected in the tension between
localism (i.e., responsiveness and alignment of health
services to users) as represented by patients, family,
citizens, and communities, and standardization (i.e.,
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consistency in quality and processes of health services) by
decision-makers and healthcare professionals.

Materials and Methods
This analysis will examine the historical contexts and
legislative imperatives that have contributed to the
proliferation of PFACs. This objective will serve as the
foundation for analyzing the tensions that may exist
between patients and healthcare professionals, most
notably, physician groups, and whether these tensions are
represented in broader policy statements, documents, and
communications. This comparative policy analysis will
occur between the province of Ontario, Canada, and
England, United Kingdom (UK). These two jurisdictions
were chosen because they possess several structural
similarities and relevant dissimilarities that may be
meaningful to determine the factors that have contributed
to the proliferation of PFACs. Canada is a federalism with
a highly decentralized health system within each of the
provinces. The federal government holds an oversight role
that provides cash transfers to provinces predicated on the
five principles of the Canada Health Act (public
administration, comprehensiveness, universality,
accessibility, and portability).19 Ontario’s system is
administered at the provincial level through the Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC), which is
managed by the Minster of Health. The system was
previously divided into 14 regional health authorities
referred to Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs).20
LHINs were developed to ensure that health services are
integrated at the local level and responsive to the needs
and preferences of patients. With the exception of
physician services, LHINs are responsible for the
administration of hospitals, long-term care homes, home
and community care, community support service agencies,
mental health and addiction agencies, and community
health centres.20 More recently, Ontario went through a
regional restructuring that created Ontario Health Teams
to replace the LHIN structure. For the purposes of this
paper, I will focus on the previous LHIN structure.
Health care in England is more centralized than Ontario
because it is stewarded at the federal level by The
Department of Health and administered by the National
Health Service (NHS). The NHS sets priorities and provides
an overall direction to improve healthcare outcomes of
citizens.21 Before the 20th century, the UK was a
centralized unitary state. However, due to shifts in political
structures and institutions, UK has become a quasifederation; containing elements of decentralization but
important elements of centralization have been
maintained. For example, the internal market reforms in
the 1990s allowed hospitals and physicians to become
private providers of health services.22 As such, physicians’
autonomy and decision-making capacity increased
dramatically. Further, the organization and processes of
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the NHS differs between subnational governments in the
UK.23 For the context of this paper, I will focus on NHS
England where relevant data is available but will substitute
my discussion with broader trends in the NHS across
subnational governments when data is unavailable.
Clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) are clinical bodies under
the NHS responsible for healthcare planning and delivery
of health services for designated communities.25 Whereas
NHS is responsible for primary care services, CCGs are
groups of clinicians responsible for secondary level care
such as planned hospital care, rehabilitative care, urgent
and emergency care, community health services, and
mental health services.25 For most of the 20th century, the
NHS has been divided into regional health authorities,
which have decreased in number overtime and were
eliminated under the Health and Social Care Act (2012).26
Today, the NHS is managed by multiple trusts, legal entities
independent from the government and accountable to
service users that manage different areas of the system
such as NHS hospitals.25
This analysis was informed by policy documents,
statements, and briefs from comparator jurisdictions
relevant to PE and PFACs, which was found through a
grey literature search. Relevant parliamentary and
legislative materials (bills, acts, debates, and briefings)
specific to Ontario were searched through the Legislative
Assembly of Ontario, e-Laws, and CanLII databases
accessed from the University of Toronto Library.
European materials were found through the same process
but through the European-specific function, and
specifically England. This latter search was augmented
with another search on relevant legislative databases in the
UK. A previous comprehensive literature search on PE
was utilized to retrieve studies that focus on the politics
and/or policy of PFACs in comparator jurisdictions. This
analysis does not only focus on hospital PFACs, but also
the administration of committee-like PE mechanisms in
healthcare. Moreover, there is muddling between patient
engagement and patient and public involvement (PPI) as
the latter appears to be the predominant term used in the
UK. This analysis will focus exclusively on PE because
public involvement is a distinct phenomenon with
different historical and scholarly literature grounded in
citizen empowerment that warrants a separate
investigation. Tritter (2009) described PPI as the “ways in
which patients can draw on their experience and members
of the public can apply their priorities to the evaluation,
development, organization and delivery of health
services”.26 This definition differentiates between PE and
public involvement and will guide the distinction between
these two concepts wherever possible. However, it is
anticipated that PPI may not be delineated in English
policy documents. In such cases, this analysis will describe
them together while noting that they are different
mechanisms for participation. Moreover, “physicians” in
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this paper refer to professional self-regulated entities and
their members.
Two frameworks will be used to analyze and answer the
research questions. First, interests from the 3I framework
(ideas, interests, and institutions) will be used to examine
the relationships between patients and other health system
actors, most notably physicians.27 This analysis will be
augmented by a second framework, Kingdon’s Organized
Anarchy Model of public policy making.28 This model
describes three streams (problem, political, and policy),
which when congruent, present a window for making
policy decisions. This model will be used to demonstrate
the factors that stimulated the need to develop PFAC-like
mechanisms in comparator jurisdictions, or alternatively,
remove these mechanisms. By tracing different periods of
time where PFACs were powerful in both jurisdictions,
this model will demonstrate how the three streams can
elucidate the symbolic, relational, and legislative enablers
or barriers of PE. Two related concepts will be used to
augment this analysis: path dependency (i.e., a situation where
previously ratified policies become self-reinforcing in
future policy formulations)29 and policy layering (i.e., adding
new elements of a policy onto a stabilized institutional
framework).30 This discussion will revolve around the
decision-making capacity of patients and physicians. Decisionmaking capacity may represent the veto points and power
available to different groups in a complex system. This
analysis adopts a technocratic perspective of power in
healthcare – there is a limited pool of decision-making
capacity available to healthcare interests, most of which
will be given to healthcare providers by legislation. This
characteristic introduces elements of tension between
PFACs and physician groups that permeate in
organizational planning and policy activities. As such, since
this analysis focuses on PFACs, the most relevant levels of
PE are meso- and macro-levels. PE at the micro-level (i.e.,
direct clinical care) is beyond the scope of this analysis.

Results
Factors the Influenced How and Why the PE Came
onto Agendas

England
Historical archives describe provisions for PPI in England
before the inception of NHS. A widely adopted
mechanism during this time was friendly societies introduced
in 1911 to oversee and manage primary care services.31
Friendly societies were comprised of patients and citizens
who would contract primary care physicians to practice
within their community.32 At the same time, hospitals were
governed by hospital management committees, which composed
of local citizens including patients and religious activists.
These committees were responsible for appointing
physicians, controlling patient admissions, managing
income and expenditure of hospitals, and overseeing
medical care.31 Although these committees were initially
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dominated by wealthy philanthropists, after 1914, service
user representation exceeded other groups because their
charitable donations to hospitals became the highest.
Since these pioneering PPI mechanisms in healthcare,
there has been ebb and flow with regards to patients’
decision-making capacity. Progressive reforms have
contributed to these fluctuations, which for the most part
of England’s history, have been in favor of greater
physician autonomy and decision-making capacity. A
historical analysis found that the British Medical
Association (BMA) and its member primary care
physicians disliked their relationship with friendly societies
that stemmed from an employee-employer relationship
characterized by employees’ belief that they were elite
professionals serving non-elite citizens.31 There were
regular conflicts between friendly societies and the BMA,
which largely focused on remuneration and privileging the
expertise of physicians over others. Some believe that
these conflicts were bolstered by higher perceived social
status presumed by physicians.31
These disputes gradually led to structural reforms in favor
of physician groups, such as the rebranding of friendly
societies into approved societies that had control over
insurance schemes but could no longer oversee the
delivery of primary health care.31 As a part of this
structural reform, the predominant funding model also
changed from an annual, renewable contract controlled
and monitored by friendly societies to a per capita
payment controlled by insurance committees that
comprised of elite professionals. As such, physician
accountability shifted from citizens to industrial and
professional elites of society.
The introduction of NHS England and a universal health
coverage scheme was a critical juncture that exemplified
ongoing tensions between patients and physicians. The
advent of universal health coverage appeared to have
temporarily reduced the tensions between physicians and
patients that had cumulated by the disputes between
physician groups and friendly societies. At this time, it was
assumed that patient interests were best represented by the
medical profession.33 On the one hand, the previous
unitary state had strong legislative provisions in place for
PPI through friendly societies, although this decreased
over time in favor of physician interests. The NHS Acts of
1946 and 1947, however, removed all PPI mechanisms in
healthcare.31 Due to conflicts between physicians and
friendly societies, this negotiation may have been made to
bring physician interests to the table of universal health
coverage by removing PPI, so opposition to their
autonomy and decision-making capacity could be
minimized.31
Interestingly, there is no record of public backlash after
the removal of PPI from legislation.32 A historical analysis
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conjectured that due to high public satisfaction with
regards to universal health coverage, mechanisms for PPI
were underprioritized by citizens or they viewed that their
interests could be advanced by the medical profession. 33
The introduction of NHS was a moment of temporary
reconciliation. Institutionalizing health services that were
free at the point of delivery reframed the way in which
accountability and transparency were achieved in
healthcare.26 Eventually, the need for PPI mechanisms
started to rise with the inception of consumer movements
in the 1960s and 1970s.10 Patient interest groups
proliferated during this time, but these groups did not hold
the same decision-making power as before the NHS.34
Nonetheless, the reintroduction of patient interest groups
ushered a new era of PPI. Disease-specific groups
continued to proliferate in the 1980s.35 However, the NHS
did not have the legislation or infrastructure to
accommodate this emerging movement within the existing
healthcare milieu, which created tensions between PPI and
other groups.
In 1974, patient associations attempted to introduce a
Patients Rights Bill that would allow patients to refuse
treatment. Patient associations were particularly concerned
with using patients for medical education without their
consent.35 However, the Bill was not successful due to the
language and strong interests that opposed patient
movements at the time.35 In the same year, the
government introduced Community Health Councils (CHCs)
as an attempt to accommodate service user interests in
healthcare.36-38 This dramatic reorganization of health
services was prompted by the emerging concern that
patients were being used as subjects in clinical trials
without their consent.39 The development of CHCs were
championed by consumer interests and represented
another critical juncture where for the first time since the
NHS a mechanism was introduced that appeared to have
strong legislative authority over the design and delivery of
health services. CHCs oversaw services, assessed local
needs, supported patients, advised on complaints, and
participated in health planning.39-40 CHCs also conducted
evaluations of existing services to reveal areas for
improvement. For example, the Central Birmingham CHC
recommended hiring interpreters at health service
organizations to support staff to communicate with Asian
patients.41 However, there was lack of detail on how CHCs
would integrate into the existing healthcare system and
how they would be evaluated.31 These characteristics
would later contribute to their delicate position within
NHS policy.
In 1982, Margaret Thatcher considered disbanding CHCs,
but this decision was not carried out due to fear of
defensive outcry by the public.31 Public outcry was an
important concern during this time because of consumer
movements that were growing in multiple industries.
However, certain policy decisions were made that
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undermined the decision-making authority of CHCs.
Multiple reports indicated that CHCs were regularly
dismissed or not included in planning meetings with
regional health authorities and trusts.31 Moreover, before
the next election, the Labour government advocated for
the broader role of CHCs in healthcare. However, in NHS
Plan 2000, the Labour government eliminated CHCs,
perhaps to appease physician interests.42 Despite this
setback, there appears to have been a widening of
discussion after this time surrounding PPI and its role in
the NHS.43-49
CHCs were replaced by Public and Patient Involvement Forums
in 2003 that worked with NHS trusts to establish a system
for PPI. However, an internal evaluation reported that
these forums did not adequately reflect the voices they
were meant to represent.50-51 Furthermore, due to
budgetary cutbacks and opposition from physicians, these
were eventually replaced by Local Involvement Networks
(LINks) under the Local Government and Public Involvement in
Health Act (2007).52 LINks had more decision-making
authority than the forums, but less than CHCs.26,31 Their
mandate was to use patient feedback and experiences to
recommend changes to local health services, particularly
commissioning local services and priority-setting, which
partially resembled friendly societies in the pre-NHS era.26
Around the same time, the newly elected Labour
government in 2009 introduced the NHS Constitution for
England, which included 25 patient rights.39 However, in
2010, a white paper released by the government called
Liberating the NHS proposed the abolition of LINks and
introduction of Healthwatch England under the Health and
Social Care Act (2012).24 The explicit objective of this policy
was to strengthen PPI within healthcare. The mandate for
Healthwatch was similar to CHCs and LINks but the
organization reported directly to the Department of
Health and could only recommend changes without any
legislative power for enforcement.53-54 Healthwatch also
did not have power over incentive mechanisms,
remuneration schemes, and physician delivery practices
whereas previous PPI mechanisms had some advisory
power over these aspects.31 Moreover, Healthwatch has
experienced gradual reductions in funding, with
approximately 25% of their funding reported to have
disappeared in 2014.55
In comparison to previous PPI mechanisms, it appears
that Healthwatch England was another attempt to reduce
decision-making capacity of patients and citizens in favor
of physician interests. There is an ebb and flow between
the decision-making capacity of both parties. Even though
physicians will continue to have greater leverage over
structural reforms and policy directions, patient interest
groups are stronger than before and increasing in strength.
New reforms will promote the mobilization of patient
groups; for example, some legislators are seeking to
replace Healthwatch England with the old CHC model.31
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Ontario
Compared to England, the history of PE in Ontario is less
profound, which could reflect the lack of historical records
on the topic that may have allowed a nuanced analysis.
Some factors that bolstered PPI in England also occurred
in Ontario, but their effects on healthcare were different
due structural differences in the health system. Unlike
England, there is no data available on whether there were
provisions for PE in healthcare before the inception of the
Hospital Insurance Act (1947) and the Medical Care Insurance
Act (1962) in Ontario that provided universal health
coverage for hospital and physician services, respectively.
In an evaluation of PFACs in Ontario, The Change
Foundation (TCF) – an independent health policy think-tank
– found that some specialized hospitals (i.e., mental health
and pediatric health institutions) were among the first to
pioneer PFACs.9 However, there is limited data on which
facilities formed these PFACs, when they formed them,
and whether they exist today. Early PFACs were most
often established because of adverse patient events and
comprised of mostly patients and community members.9
These pioneering PFACs, advanced greater and more
meaningful involvement of service users, family, and care
representatives in healthcare. General hospitals were much
slower to adopt PFACs, which had not occurred until early
21st century.8
PFACs in hospitals and communities were supported by
legislative imperatives of the Canada Health Act (1984).
These imperatives may have been an outcome of the
burgeoning consumer-driven movements during the 1970s
and 1980s. In Ontario, these consumer movements may
have contributed to one of the principles of the Canada
Health Act – known as Public Administration – that confers
regulatory authority to provinces to design and deliver
health services.11 This principle provided provinces the
legislative authority to plan, deliver, and operate a
healthcare plan with funding from federal cash transfers.11
This structural characteristic is also known as
decentralization; subnational governments have greater
autonomy and decision-making power over social services
and public policy.56 One of the aims of decentralization is
to narrow the gap between healthcare decision-making and
service users and citizens.57 Therefore, the principle of
public administration under the Canada Health Act (1984)
as well as the burgeoning consumer-driven movements at
the same time may have created a policy window for
provinces to adopt mechanisms through which the needs
and preferences of services users can be integrated into
healthcare planning and delivery.26 In 2002, the Romanow
Commission recommended developing mechanisms for
citizen involvement in health policy processes to
strengthen accountability and narrow the gap between
taxpayers and decision-makers.58 This recommendation
represented the first formal and explicit record of
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involving non-professionals in healthcare activities as a
solution to emerging problems.
Some provinces have taken steps to further decentralize
healthcare by forming regional health authorities. For
example, the Local Health System Integration Act (2006)
divided Ontario into 14 LHINs, allowing regions to
determine allocation imperatives and cooperation between
neighboring healthcare institutions. One of the explicit
goals of this act was to achieve a more connected and
integrated health system.20 As a result of further
decentralization, this Act may have encouraged stronger
legislative imperatives to pursue PFAC mechanisms that
bring decision-making closer to service users.
The Excellence Care for All Act (2010) was another legislative
agenda that reinforced the need to place patient needs at
the centre of health system planning.59 Due to bipartisan
support, this Act contributed to greater participation of
patients in healthcare activities. Ontario hospitals were
required to obtain patient experience data, develop a
declaration of patient and public values that would guide
health service design, and create mechanisms for a patient
relation process to solicit and improve patients’
experiences. Moreover, hospitals were required to involve
patients and family in the development of annual quality
improvement plans, as well as provide a description of
their PE activities.60 This Act provided an imperative to
create PFACs for hospitals who had not already created
one. Moreover, for hospitals with existing PFACs, this
imperative opened a window for increased funding to
expand its operations. Even more important, this Act may
have set the precedent for the Patients First Act (2016) with
a provision for each LHIN to establish a PFAC that would
discuss regional allocation imperatives, cooperation, and
health system improvement.61 With both Acts, there were
strong legislative imperatives in place to establish and
sustain PFACs at multiple levels of health care decisionmaking.
In spite of these legislative imperatives, there were
emerging tensions between localism championed by
service users and subnational standardization of health
services advanced by other stakeholders, specifically
physician groups. In particular, the Patients First Act (2016)
was opposed by the Ontario Medical Association (OMA).
The OMA did not support the formation of committees to
monitor the quality of health services, especially physician
services62-63 because they believed it would undermine
their role in delivering patient-centered care. It may be the
case, however, that the OMA used “patient-centered care”
as an idea to maintain their decision-making capacity in
healthcare.
Evaluation
There has been little research on the evaluation of PFACs
in communities or health service organizations. The
research that has been conducted was commissioned by
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non-government agencies or think tanks. In Ontario, TCF
conducted a qualitative investigation of hospital PFACs in
2014.9 They conducted in-depth interviews with 64 staff,
patients, and family members across 29 hospitals with
PFACs. As a part of this study, TCF also conducted a
literature review of Ontario hospital PFACs to determine
whether it was an effective mechanism for PE. They
found that a minority of hospital PFACs conducted
evaluations. The PFACs that performed evaluation kept
track of participant meeting attendance, provided annual
updates of achievements, conducted annual and monthly
self-evaluations, created annual performance review
documents, facilitated impact surveys of member
participation, and designed and implemented a preliminary
evaluation framework.9 However, TCF underscored these
findings by stating that there is a general lack of
information on the effectiveness of PFACs within
hospitals and at other levels of government.
There has also been no research evaluating the impact of
PFACs in government agencies. At the time of writing this
paper, there was an internal evaluation being conducted
for LHIN PFACs in Ontario. However, Ontario is
undergoing a regional restructuring that is replacing the
previous LHIN with Ontario Health Teams. There are
several PE evaluation tools available in the public domain.
In a recent systematic review, 27 unique PE evaluation
tools were found.64 Evaluation of PE occurs in many
hospitals, including University Health Network in
Toronto, Ontario.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
(SWOT)
Based on the analysis presented in this paper, a SWOT
exercise was conducted to determine the strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that PFACs and
related PE mechanisms face in 21st century healthcare.
Table 1 presented the findings of this exercise. These
findings are discussed in more detail in the following
sections.

Comparative Analysis and Discussion
This paper reveals multiple lessons for PE in jurisdictions
around the world. The implicit message has been that
there is a constant, tacit tension between patient and other
interests, most notably physicians with regards to decisionmaking capacity in healthcare. For some part of England’s
history, this tension exemplified the conflict between
localism championed by patients and citizens and
standardization bolstered by physicians and other interests.
The analysis of Ontario and England shows that this
tension is tacit within the negotiations made by

93

The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory committees (PFACs), Majid

Table 1. Results from SWOT Analysis
Strengths
• Improves responsiveness and alignment of health
services with patient/family needs and preferences
• Narrows the gap between healthcare decisionmaking and service users
• Improves perceived transparency and accountability
of health services
• Increases legislative, political, ethical, social, and
organizational imperatives for patient engagement

Weaknesses
• Early legislation formed a stable institutional
framework for future changes to patient engagement
through path dependency and policy layering
• Big bang elimination of PE mechanisms may result
in a gap in infrastructure with regards to localism in
healthcare
• Strong interests in healthcare may perceive localism
as a threat to their professional interests

Opportunities
• Expanding the legislative imperatives of patient
engagement to reflect a balance between localism
and standardization
• Incremental introduction to patient engagement
mechanisms is possible due to strong external and
internal pressures
• Formation of alliances between patient groups and
other interests in healthcare (e.g., administrations,
physicians, decision-makers) can create strong
precedents for patient engagement in healthcare
practice

Threats
• Patient engagement used to legitimize existing ways
of practice and interventions at institutions
• Patient groups overpower physicians and other
healthcare professionals in some areas of health
service organizations
• Continued risk of big bang elimination of patient
engagement mechanisms in favor of physician
interests for achieving broader policy goals
• Arguments against localism that weakens the
strength of patient engagement mechanisms, and
may contribute to big bang elimination in health
system structure

governments for new health legislation. In England, for
example, provider interests did not support PPI because of
a belief that it opposed national standards, optimal
resource allocation imperatives, the value of expert
medical judgement, and autonomous decision-making.
This conflict likely prompted ongoing dispute between
friendly societies and physician groups in the pre-NHS era,
which cumulated overtime and may have contributed to
the gradual reduction of localism in favor of physician
interests.
The persistence of these tensions ultimately led to ebb and
flow between greater decision-making capacity between
localism and standardization. Pre-NHS, England had
strong mechanisms for PPI in the form of friendly
societies in communities and voluntary committees in
hospitals. With the introduction of the NHS, however,
PPI had minimal legislative support. It was not until the
consumer-driven movements of the 1970s that
reinvigorated the need for localism.10 As a result of these
movements, there has been a back and forth with regards
to the power devolved to PPI mechanisms, which led to
the formation of CHCs, then the forums, then LINks, and
now Healthwatch England. Similarly, in Ontario,
mechanisms for PE have been minimal, but since the
consumer-driven movements, they have gradually
increased overtime through several legislative imperatives.
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However, it remains to be seen whether the negotiations
that occurred in England to reduce PPI mechanisms in
favor of physician interests has occurred in the past or will
occur in Ontario in the future. Nonetheless, practitioners
and policy-makers in this area can appreciate the back and
forth that exists between localism and standardization and
some of the policy instruments and ideas they can employ
to achieve their goals. This comparative analysis explains
the possible factors that can contribute to tensions
between interests and the ebb and flow of decision-making
capacity in healthcare.
Centralized Authority
Boothe (2012) hypothesized that the distribution of
decision-making authority in a nation determines the
policy-making approaches.65 A more centralized nation,
such as England, may be more likely to pursue big bang
transformations, whereas a more decentralization state,
such as Ontario, may take a more incremental approach
because of the compendium of interests involved in policy
formulation and implementation.65 Since there are more
actors within decentralized nations, there are more
opportunities to oppose big bang transformations that
may support broader goals of increased PE. Moreover,
incremental change allows multiple interests to bargain and
negotiate. An incremental approach to health policy in
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such cases may be the only suitable way to pursuing
change.
The analysis of Ontario may indicate that new legislation
that supports PE and policy layering that bolsters PE can
broaden the decision-making capacity of PFACs. These
approaches can build a strong foundation for increasing
the extent to which service users can participate in
healthcare decision-making at different levels. However,
big bang changes that broaden PE goals may have been
attempted but not successful in both comparator
jurisdictions due to a belief by physician interests that
patient decision-making capacity may conflict with their
own desire for autonomy. On the other hand, big bang
transformations that seek to eliminate PE from healthcare
may also be difficult to achieve. The one exception to this
was demonstrated by the English case where the removal
of PPI mechanisms may have been compensated by the
introduction of universal health coverage. This policy
decision was also made before the consumer-driven
movements when patient groups were weaker interests,
which made it an opportune time to use PPI as a
bargaining chip to bring strong physician interests to the
table of broader healthcare equity goals. However, with the
proliferation of consumer-driven industries, localism reemerged as a strong force that reignited the discussions
surrounding the role of patients in healthcare. This
example shows that physician interests in some cases, may
not support localism and patient interests if they have
framed the conflict as impinging on their decision-making
authority.
On the flip side, it is also possible that patient interests and
localism can be used by physicians as a political lever to
advance their own decision-making goals, which was
demonstrated by OMA’s responses to “patient-centered”
legislation. Mold (2011) hypothesized that the lack of
clarity in the “patient rights” movements allowed
healthcare interests to coopt the language and narrative of
PE to achieve their own goals.36 Therefore, it may be
conjectured that in a more centralized state, healthcare
professionals have less power that may prompt stronger
opposition to any changes from the government that may
affect their decision-making capacity. In a more
decentralized state, on the other hand, professionals may
hold more power and as such, may instead coopt PE to
achieve their professional goals in negotiations with
governments. Similarly, it may also be the case that PE has
been used to align the political stream with the problem
and policy streams to render windows of opportunities for
transforming the extent to which patients engage in
healthcare activities.
From these two cases, it appears that building the
infrastructure for PE tends to be incremental (i.e.,
incremental introduction) and removing provisions for it can
be achieved through big bang transformations (i.e., big bang
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elimination) if there are mechanisms to compensate for
losses. This parallel between promoting and removing PE
mechanisms is a natural conclusion of the compendium of
interests that characterize healthcare and often tend to
maintain the status quo. This parallel between incremental
introduction and big bang elimination is made possible
due to the unequal distribution of power in healthcare in
favor of provider interests. The power imbalance between
patients and providers is longstanding in the history of
medicine, and although it is less explicit today, this
imbalance continues to permeate in broader legislative and
policy activities as demonstrated through this analysis.
There is a nuance to this contrast that is not captured in
Boothe’s hypothesis of centralized authority and policy
change. Overtime, strong consumer-driven movements in
England led to the reintroduction of PPI mechanisms in
legislation. However, this reintroduction was incremental
in nature, possibly due to the diversity of and resistance by
strong interests. It is possible, therefore, that an
incremental approach to policy change may still be used in
centralized states when there are diverse interests that
oppose policy change. The important factor to policy
change is how these interests are structured within the
nation, and the veto points they hold to support or oppose
proposed policy transformations.

Path Dependency and Policy Layering

An implication of the contrast between incremental
introduction and big bang elimination relates to the
tendency for path dependency in policy processes. Boothe
(2012) asserted that if initial approaches and conditions to
health policy development are limiting in a nation, then
they become limiting overtime.65 This observation was
seen in the introduction of NHS that removed legislative
imperatives for PPI. This removal set the precedent for
gradual reduction in decision-making authority of patients
in favor of physician interests. Using path dependency as a
framework for future policy formulations may have been
supported by legislators’ need to negotiate with strong
physician interests to achieve broader healthcare goals. In
such instances, PE may serve as a policy instrument for
legislators to sacrifice if physicians perceived it as an
opposition to their professional interests. This finding is
similar to Tritter (2009) who argued that the degree of PE
has been a strongly influenced by law and policy developed
in the 19th century – something that characterizes the
effects of path dependency on PE legislation. Path
dependency that resulted from removing strong legislative
imperatives for PPI, as in the case of NHS England, made
it difficult to introduce effective mechanisms for PPI
thereafter (i.e., CHCs, forums, LINks, Healthwatch
England). For example, Sustainability and Transformation
Partnerships (STP) were introduced in 2016 to address the
emerging problems of English healthcare.66 However,
research has found that they lack adequate accountability
to citizens and may represent yet another trend in the ebb
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and flow of PPI in England that undermines the decisionmaking capacity of patients.67
The case of Ontario is characterized by ongoing policy
layering with gradual introduction of legislation that
cumulatively broadened the role of patients in healthcare.
It may be hypothesized that policy layering may ultimately
lead to a point where patients become more powerful than
physician interests in healthcare. This outcome is similar to
the function of friendly societies that existed before the
NHS who were comprised of patients and citizens that
determined the planning and delivery of health services
within their communities. A PE mechanism like friendly
societies has the potential for multiple, beneficial
outcomes, for example professional accountability.
However, PE must address important conceptual
arguments, for example, that it opposes national
standardization of health services, allocation imperatives,
and medical judgement. Mechanisms for PE can be
developed that balance the benefits of both localism and
national standardization in a way that is negotiated
between various healthcare interests. Another approach
can be to reframe the meaning of localism and
standardization whereby health outcomes, quality, and
cost-effectiveness also result from localism, but require
different infrastructure and legislative imperatives.

Strengths and Limitations of this Analysis

The comparison between England and Ontario presented
interesting contrasts with regards to the factors that have
contributed to the formation of PFACs and related
mechanisms. On the one hand, England has had a
profound history of PPI that allows tensions between
different interests to be mapped and compared and
elucidate how legislative factors have contributed to the
ebb and flow of PPI. On the other hand, PE in Ontario is
nascent, and it remains to be seen what tensions emerge as
it is increasingly integrated in the milieu of healthcare.
Lessons from England provide essential information about
the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that
Ontario may face as the desire for their involvement in
healthcare activities increases. This information is vital for
decision-makers and academics who contribute to a
patient-centered legislative agenda.
Despite the strengths, this analysis has two notable
limitations. It may be the case that Ontario has had
remanence of PFACs and related mechanisms throughout
its history, possibly before the inception of Medicare.
However, there are no historical records with this
information. If such mechanisms have existed in Ontario,
it would augment the current analysis, and possibly offer
additional, insightful parallels with English PPI
movements.
This paper also assumed that legislators are “unbiased
intermediaries” between patients and physicians. However,
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legislators and decision-makers have strong interests
within healthcare as well. However, since the focus of this
paper was to elucidate tensions between healthcare
providers and patients, it was assumed for simplicity that
other interests were neutral, stable, and constant. This
position comes from the technocratic perspective that
added a “critical” lens to this analysis. This perspective
allowed problematizing the relationships and interactions
between strong healthcare interests.

Conclusion/Policy Recommendations
This comparative analysis reviewed the historical contexts
and legislative imperatives that have contributed to the
proliferation of PFACs in England, United Kingdom and
Ontario, Canada. This analysis found a persistent tension
between patients and PFACs, and other healthcare
interests. The persistence of these tensions emphasizes the
ebb and flow of decision-making capacity between
localism and standardization with regards to health service
planning and decision-making. This analysis also found
that building the infrastructure for PE has been
incremental in both jurisdictions and current trends show
that it will continue along this path, especially since
jurisdictions adopt path dependency and policy layering as
principles for policies that support PE. However,
removing the infrastructure can be drastic if it is
compensated by publicly driven priorities such as universal
health coverage. This relationship between PE and
broader health system objectives are exemplified in the
relationships that exist between healthcare interests. It may
be conjectured that a more centralized state, whereby
healthcare professionals have lower autonomy compared
to a more decentralized state, may prompt stronger
opposition to any changes from the government that may
affect their decision-making capacity, in this case, making
provisions to improve the autonomy of patient groups. On
the other hand, since professionals in a more decentralized
state have more veto points may instead coopt the PE to
achieve their professional goals in negotiations with
governments and other interests. Practitioners and policymakers can appreciate the back and forth that may exist
between localism and standardization. This comparative
analysis explains the possible factors that can contribute to
the tensions between interests and the ebb and flow of
decision-making capacity in healthcare. This analysis also
offers important insight to patients, decision-makers, and
healthcare professionals on the factors that may support or
oppose PE and the policy instruments and ideas that they
can use to achieve their objectives.
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